Financial Stability and Instability Presented by the Example of Sub Prime Crisis by Ágnes Csiszárik-Kocsir et al.
MEB 2008 – 6
th International Conference on Management, Enterprise and Benchmarking 
May 30-31, 2008      Budapest, Hungary 
  253 
Financial Stability and Instability Presented by 
the Example of Sub Prime Crisis 
Ágnes Csiszárik-Kocsir 
assistant professor, Budapest Tech, kocsir.agnes@kgk.bmf.hu 
Erzsébet Elek dr. 
associate professor, Budapest Tech, elek.erzsebet@kgk.bmf.hu 
Mónika Fodor 
senior assistant professor, Károly Róbert College, mfodor@karolyrobert.hu 
Erika Varga 
assistant professor, Károly Róbert College, evarga@karolyrobert.hu 
Abstract: The millennium created a great number of favourable conditions for the 
American economy. There was economic prsperity, the participants were optimistic, which 
was further enhanced by the optimisim of the fiscal and monetary authorities. These factors 
resulted in a very quick rise in the demand for real estate, a boom in the real estate price 
and in addition, the prosperity of the mortgage market. The low global level of interest 
made application for different types of mortgages possible for many people. This practice 
of granting credit lasted till 2007 when the real estate market bubble blown so huge in the 
previous years and was born and kept alive by the careless interest placement practice of 
credit institutions burst. The objective of our paper is to present the unstable state of 
financial instability through the example of the crisis of the American mortgage market by 
hihglighting the main reasons and arguments that generated and kept up the crisis. During 
the making of the study we relied on the most up-to-date sources to make a true picture of 
the present state of the crisis. 
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1  Precedents and the Present Sitation 
The stength and stability of the American economy aexist only in the past. The 
real estate boom that peaked last year and the real estate crisis that came alive as a 
side effect have spread worldwide so there is no single economy that could not be 
more or less affected in this process. 
Subprime credits became attractive in the second half of the 90’s and it was not 
until 2004 when they reached a record height. In the meantime, real estate prices 
also soared that helped speculative investment in real estate to be prosperous in 
the hope of gaining bigger profit. Alan Greenspan, president of FED favoured 
both the public and the banks with the base rate set around1-2% but as we can see, 
only in short term. Minimal level of interest rate resulted in unlimited credit 
extensions. The American banks, the most innovative and developed 
representatives of the financial intermediary system came along with countless 
financial constructions when noticing the situation, which only increased demand 
for credits inducing huge bank earnings. The competition between creditors in the 
USA resulted in the considerable loosening of credit conditions by taking a greater 
and greater credit risk for the extra profits that could be realised. Among the 
debtors the so-called „subprime
1” debtors appeared in greater numbers whose 
creditworthiness is below the standard (those with low income, unemployed, 
pensioners (Ficher-Kóczán, 2008). 
Subprime credits have considerably greater interest earnings with which risk is in 
line. The real innovation in profitability and risk reduction is a new phenomenon, 
making mortgage securities, that was the chepaest step towards enhancing 
liquidity from the part of the banks. Careless credit extension was even made 
worse by credit assessors as it should have been their task to examine the credit 
risk of securieis issued this way. 
The real decrease began in 2006 when the real esate market started to go down 
and due to the rise of the interest rate, credit debits became greater so bad debt 
appeared in masses causing significant losses to investors (Pénzcentum, 2008b). 
The process reached its peak at the beginning of 2007 and in spring there were 
fears and doubts about the riskiness of American mortgage market (MNB, 2008). 
The stability of subprime and other mortgage bonds was shaken and it was 
confirmed by the leading credit assessing institutions. By autumn the first, most 
striking signs of the crisis became visible: market uncertainty and rumours about 
bank lossess flooded the market. Inter-bank market totally dried out not only in the 
USA but also in the Eurozone. 
                                                 
1   The group of risky clients who used to have payment difficulties, who do not possess 
the required collateral and due to their low income, the debt/income proportion is 
rather high. MEB 2008 – 6
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Figure 1 
Changing credit terms between 2003-2007 
2 
(Source: MNB) 
As most banks do not know how sone single institution is affected by the crisis-hit 
American market, we can state that global lack of trust was created among the 
players of the financial system. Thelack of trust led to the fatc that banks were not 
willing to extend any secured or unsecured credits to one another so practically 
their extra liquidity was piled up on their own accounts. According to a study of 
the Hungarian National Bank (MNB) published in February 2008 (Fischer-
Kóczán, 2008) „liquidity did not disappear from the system only its redistribution 
became impossible”. Since the beginning of the crisis banks were less and less 
able to finance their transfers from external resources. Moreover, a significant part 
of American households went into debt. These two factors led to the abandonment 
of aggressive crediting practices of the banks whose direct outcome was the 
reduction of bank profits. In the firs couple of months of the present year banks 
were compelled to write off significant losses
3 and it was truly reflected in the rate 
of their stocks
4. 
Global lack of trust in the whole banking system still holds true nowadays 
although signs for the end the crisis are also visible. The greatest losers of the 
                                                 
2   Positive values mean making the terms stricter, negative values indicate making the 
terms looser. 
3   Several ten billion write-offs per institution. 
4   Rate decline was a lot greater than justified in many cases as the market priced a 
greater loss than actual. Á. Csiszárik-Kocsir et al. 
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crisis and the drying out of inter-bank money market are credit banks who do not 
possess public savings so the only source of financing their activities derives from 
the inter-bank money market. 
Credit market crisis last nearly one year but we still cannot draw a balance how 
many credit institutions, companies and households how and to what extent are 
affected. Fear still controls market participants but there is a slight ray of hope for 
the future. Markets, stock exchanges and rates are still “ready to jump” andextra 
sensitively react to any kind of change. 
However, the market needs years to get over the shocks. If we only consider the 
outcomes of the dotcom crisis, we can see how surprisingly long time (7 years) 
were necessary for the sector to regenerate. According to the opinion of some 
experts the banking system “needs not less, either” as the trust in riskier money 
market tools is totally lost and their extra liquidity is invested rather in safer 
investments of lower return (Portfólió, 2008a). The behaviour described above is 
also presented by Figure 2 that shows the greatest write-offs of global financial 
players in connection with the crisis. It can be seen that the crisis also affected the 
biggest institutions not only the more sensitive credit banks failed as a result of the 
crisis. 
Furthermore, it is also striking that among the listed financial players only a few 




























































































































The greatest write-offs of international financial players (bn USD) 
(Source: Portfólió.hu, 2008a) MEB 2008 – 6
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2  Mortgage Market Crisis and the Minsky Theory 
The financial system if not controlled can develop bubbles by destroying itself. 
This correlation was formulated by Hyman Minsky, American economist years 
ago. According to the Minsky theory all crises has seven well discernible stages 
and declares that crises have a lot in common in many aspects. 
The stages of crises: 
1  Displacement: 
All crises begin with a trouble so there is something uncommon happening in 
the market (economic-political change, decrease in the rate of interest). This 
change can affect any sector of the economy. 
2  Prices start to increase: 
As a result of the change prices are bout to rise in the affected sector. At the 
beginning the economic players can hardly feel price rise but if this effect is 
there to last, the players’ attention is caught. 
3  Easy credit: 
High prices themselves are not enough to create a bubble so it needs a kind of 
„fuel”: easy credit. If the participants of the financial sector did not heat the 
situation with their easy credit, the affected sector would return to the 
ordinary state. Easy credit attracts players from outside who join this affected 
segment of the economy in the hope of making more profit. 
4  Overtrading: 
As a result of easy credit markets start to grow dramatically that is reflected in 
greater trading and scarcity in some cases. Prices start to rise that induces 
huge profit making on the supply side. Consequently, the sector attracts more 
external participants and prices will become uncontrolled. The rising pace of 
price increase attracts more and more careless and greedy participants to the 
market. As fire needs more wood to burn better, bubbles also need more 
outsiders. 
5  Euphoria: 
The bubble created this way cannot grow further. Experts can see the coming 
crisis and warn the others but the participants do not want to listen. Prices will 
soar further and speculation starts. Speculators know that prices cannot go up 
forever but they deny it to attract more outsiders. Speculators will remain in 
the market till the situation seems to be stable but they exit before the bubble 
bursts and the „less knowledgeable” players will be stuck inside. 
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6  Insider profit taking: 
Certain players gain huge profit in the making of the bubble but others will 
fail. „Insiders” will come out in silence with their pocket filled, which signals 
the beginning of the end. 
7  Revulsion: 
Revulsion can be evoked by several factors: the profit line in the sector 
declines dramatically, unexpected bad news and euphoria will immediately 
turn into revulsion. The sector is „in flames” and everybody escapes. 
Revulsion comes, prices decrease, profit rates go down and it is the end for 
easy credit. Losses pile up, everybody escapes but there is no way out. 
Minsky with his theory formulated the paradox of bubble theory (Shostak, 2007): 
everybody knows that the combination of easy credit, over-demand and euphoria 
will sooner or later become lethal. However, America falls in the trap from time to 
time so starting from the supply bubbles to the real estate bubbles we could meet a 
lot of types of bubbles so far. As it can be seen, the stages listed above can be 
traced from point to point even in connection with the present-day sub prime 
crisis. A question can be raised: if there is a useful theory about the creation and 
operation of crises, then why do not the economic and market leaders listen? In 
our opinion analysing the answer would be too difficult but could be summarised 
in four words: the greediness of market participants. 
3  The Effect of the Crisis on European and 
Hungarian Participants 
The crisis rearranged the economy of the United States significantly. Households 
went into debt in such an excessive way than never before so through the cutting 
of their consumption expenses they significantly hinder economy. Through the 
tight relation of the EU and the USA the effects are transferred to the European 
economy so Hungary is not an exception, either. 
Financial markets are related on a global level, they cannot exist in isolation, they 
are in everyday financial contact or they are subsidiaries or parent companies of 
one another. Our country can be regarded lucky from the aspect that the parent 
companies, headquarters of our banks are not or only slightly affected in the crisis. 
Global lack of liquidity directly or indirectly has an impact on our country, as 
well. 
As we know, Hungary acts as a net liabilities importer on global financial markets. 
In a country like Hungary, that significantly depend on international capital import 
making it more difficult by the unfavourable prospect of growth, the high level of 
indebtedness and rather bad or worsening macroeconomic indicators from a MEB 2008 – 6
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regional aspect, the aftermaths of the crisis can definitely be felt that has an 
outstanding impact on the assessment of the national government securities. For 
many national banks, even everyday operation was made more difficult that 
causes financing problems for a net liabilities importer. The amount of the 
available external sources has been limited and the costs of the present ones are 
rising, which makes the competition for clients with savings tighter (Pénzcentrum, 
2008a). 
The stability report of the MNB draws attention to the topicality and importance 
of the topic (MNB, 2008), too. The specialists of the central bank approach the 
domestic effects from two sides: internal and external risks. 
Among the external reasons they mention the impact of global slowdown on 
decreasing export as well as the decreasing pace of global economic growth. For 
Hungary, it means decreasing revenues from the export that has a negative effect 
on the otherwise declining GDP figures. Moreover, the risk premium of the 
national assets can increase that weakens the forint, can increase the basic interest 
rate and can make import more expensive by decreasing output and increasing 
inflation risks. Besides, even the involvement of external assets is made more 
difficult for the corporate sector so their investments decrease and, as a result, they 
also hold output down, which can even worsen our not so attractive prospects of 
growth. 
The report lists the negative impact on the originally so little growth among the 
internal risks that can be due to three factors of key importance: 
a)  unfavourable labour market processes, lack of incentives and the rather 
high tax burden, 
b)  low corporate investment, 
c)  growth rate curbing real convergence process. 
The economic slowdown has an unfavourable impact on the vital macroeconomic 
issues, both consumption and investment, which refers to the more pessimistic 
expectations and the decreasing incomes incurring the decreasing demand for 
credit both in the corporate and household sectors (Portfólió, 2008b). 
If most of the outlines internal and external factors are realised, a really 
catastrophic picture can be made in connection with one of the most important 
macroeconomic factor, i.e. growth. Nevertheless, it is good news among the bad 
ones that companies as profit-oriented organisations are able to adapt to the altered 
economic situation quickly. Their demand for labour is restricted to maintain their 
profit level and their investment activity is also decreased due to the rising costs of 
materials. Unfortunately, the above-detailed behaviour of the companies will have 
a negative effect on households. It is true that real wages showed a slight increase 
in the past years but unemployment also increased- making the indebtedness of 
households even greater. This process is further enhanced by the aggressive 
marketing policy of the banks and the poor financial knowledge of households. Á. Csiszárik-Kocsir et al. 
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Subprime crisis



































The possible effects of the sub prime crisis in Hungary 
(Source: MNB, 2008) 
Conclusions 
To sum it up, we can state that the Hungarian economy will have to face difficult 
macroeconomic circumstances both in national and global levels in the 
forthcoming years. The factors below will affect macroeconomic situation 
(Portfólió, 2008c): 
−  improving budgetary balance (if the projected steps and paces can be 
kept in the future), 
−  decreasing need for external financing due to the careful banking sector, 
the planned restriction of state expenses and the decrease in investment 
activity, 
−  low and slowing down economic growth, 
−  rising prices of consumer goods and those of raw materials, 
−  rather significant inflationary push. 
However, we hope that the reasons listed above will not be considerable and the 
awaited economic miracle will be realised functioning as a protecting shield 
against the possible aftermaths of the crisis. MEB 2008 – 6
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